Reflections on the Six Day War, 40 years after

I've been reading “The Seventh Day,” David Remnick's essay in “The New Yorker” of May 28. It's a discussion of Israeli revisionist history. Remnick, who sees Israeli villains under every bed, argues that:

It [The Six Day War] was a war that Israelis regarded as existential in importance––defeat could well have meant the end of the state after less than twenty years––and yet winning had Pyrrhic consequences. Out of it came forty years of occupation, widespread illegal settlements, the intensification of Palestinian nationalism, terrorism, counterattacks, checkpoints, failed negotiations, uprisings, and ever-deepening distrust. What greater paradox of history: a war that must be won, a victory that results in consuming misery and instability.

Relying on the revisionists, Remnick denies the necessity of the war. He quotes Israeli leaders (without giving the context) who argued against going to war, and those who even afterwards said it was unnecessary. He claims that Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was wise in his reluctant ditherings; that the military forced him to go to war. Yes, he concedes, Nasser had the UN remove its peace keepers from the border so that Egyptian forces could bring their tanks and warplanes within striking distance of Tel Aviv. But even Israel's friends, the Americans and the British and the French warned Israel against striking first.

But could Israel listen to Britain and France? In 1938 they had given the same sort of advice to the young republic of Czechoslovakia with disastrous consequences. (By incredible coincidence, in 1938 Czechoslovakia was 19 years old when it was sold down the Danube; Israel was 19 years old when the same dynamic duo of appeasers tried to sell it down the Jordan.)

On June 5, 1967 Israel did attack. By placing his air force so close to the border, Nasser brought it within striking distance of Israeli fighter jets, which essentially destroyed his air capability and lost him the war. King Hussein of Jordan honored a recent pledge to Nasser and struck at Israel and lost the West Bank in exchange. (I suppose it's necessary to point out that the West Bank was part of the remnant of a proposed Arab state, one rejected by the Arabs as they invaded Israel. Gaza was the other remnant, occupied by Egypt since 1949. There never was a Palestinian state—there should have been one, one far bigger than the current West Bank and Gaza, but... As to Jerusalem, occupied by Jordanian forces since 1948, that was supposed to be an international city, open to all. Unlike Muslims permitted to pray at their holy places under Israeli rule, Jews were denied access to their holy places under the Jordanians. I just thought you would like to be reminded.)

Remnick is a fine writer, but he's fallen victim to “The Zeitgeist,” the spirit of the times, which lures historians to ruins against the rocks of misunderstanding. At first I wondered why he began with a seemingly superfluous reference to George W. Bush who called critics of his war policies “revisionist historians” but then it became abundantly clear. The spirit of Remnick's times (and mine and at last count of 70% of America's) is that the war in Iraq is an unnecessary adventure, that currently and in the future the US is and will be paying the penalties for Bush's arrogance. What Remnick forgets is that history is oracular, not predictive. It tells us truth (if we are honest) but it's never repeated. Israel in 1967 was not the United States in 2003. America's war is foolishly opportunistic, Israel's wasn't. Had Eshkol waited, a massive Arab attack would have driven the Jews into the Sea. Nasser was saying: “Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel...The critical hour has arrived.” Control of the air was essential. Either Israel had it or Egypt. There was no choice. The enemy was across an invisible line in the sand, not thousands of miles away. Nasser and his Arab allies had the ability to destroy Israel in a way that Saddam never could touch us. Al Qaeda attacked us; we attacked Al Qaeda's enemy. It was stupid. When Israel attacked it was necessary for survival. Sadly, the long term consequences are as Remnick describes them, but there would not have been a long term had Israel waited, had it not avoided being another Czechoslovakia.